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SUPREME COURT, MONROE COUNTY
People v. Owens1
(decided August 30, 2000)
In this death penalty case, the defendant, John F. Owens,
moved to preclude the admission of any alleged oral statements
made by him, claiming the police failed to record electronically the
Miranda warnings, any waiver of the warnings, as well as any
subsequent custodial interrogation.2 Defendant contended that the
failure to electronically record his alleged oral statements violated
the Due Process Clause of the Federal 3 and New York State
4
Constitutions. Defendant relied on the Alaska Supreme Court's
decision in Stephan v. Alaska5 where it was held that the failure to
electronically record a custodial interrogation while the suspect
was in a place of detention violated the suspect's right of due
process under Alaska's constitution.
6
The Supreme Court, Monroe County began its analysis by
stating, "[o]nly one other state's highest court, the Minnesota
Supreme Court, acting under its supervisory power, has adopted a
recording requirement." 7  The court added, "at least one state
legislature has codified a similar recording requirement," referring
to a Texas code enacted in 1999.8 The court also noted that "the
American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure and the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure require
the electronic recording of custodial interviews."
9
In denying defendant's motion, the Supreme Court,
Monroe County refised to prescribe a common law requirement
mandating that police electronically record Miranda warnings, any
1185 Misc. 2d 661, 713 N.Y.S.2d 452 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
2 Id. at 662, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
3 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law... ." Id. (emphasis added).
4 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. The New York Constitution provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id.
5 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985).6 Id. at 1158.
7 People v. Owens, 185 Misc. 2d at 662, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 453 (quoting State v.
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waiver thereof, and any subsequent custodial interrogation, absent
any statutory or constitutional authority.10 Accordingly, the court
held that a recording requirement is not mandated by federal or
state due process.
1'
In its analysis, the court referred to Stephan v. Alaska,
which held that because a recording does not meet the standard of
"constitutional materiality," as enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court in California v. Trombetta,12  custodial
interrogations need not be recorded to satisfy the due process
requirements of the federal constitution.' 3 To meet this standard of
"constitutional materiality," evidence must both possess an
exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was
destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be
unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably
available means. 14  The Supreme Court, Monroe County then
proceeded to hold that even in the context of a capital case, the
New York State Constitution does "not extend beyond the
parameters of federal constitutional guarantees."'
15
In California v. Trombetta,16 the respondents submitted to a
breathalyzer test" after being stopped by police officers on
suspicion of drunken driving.' 8 After registering a blood-alcohol
concentration substantially higher than the legal limit in California
at that time, the respondents were presumed to be intoxicated and
were charged with driving while intoxicated, in violation of
California law. 19  The respondents filed pre-trial motions to
suppress the breathalyzer test results on the ground that samples of
10 Id.
1 Id.
12 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
13 Owens, 185 Misc. 2d at 662, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
14 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489 (citing U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
109-10 (1976)).
15 Owens, 185 Misc. 2d at 662, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
16 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
17 Id. at 482. Drunken driving suspects are given the option, under California
law, of having either a blood test, a urine test or a breath test performed in order
to determine their blood-alcohol concentration. Here, the test performed was
actually called an Intoxilyzer test, a type of breath testing device. Id.
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respondents' breath were not preserved by the arresting officers.2 0
The respondents argued that if a breath sample would have been
preserved, the incriminating breathalyzer results could have been
impeached. 21 The Municipal Court denied respondents' motions to
suppress; the respondents sought direct appeal and their appeals
were eventually granted and transferred to the Court of Appeal. 2
The California Court of Appeal, in determining that the arresting
officers had the ability to preserve the respondents' breath samples
and in accepting that the breath samples would be useful to
respondents' defenses, ruled in favor of respondents, ordering the
test results inadmissible.23 The Court of Appeal reasoned, "[d]ue
process demands simply that where evidence is collected by the
state, as it is with . . . any . . . breath testing device, law
enforcement agencies must establish and follow rigorous and
systematic procedures to preserve the captured evidence or its
equivalent for the use of the defendant." 24 The California Supreme
Court denied certiorari, and the case went to the United States
Supreme Court.
25
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Marshall, reversed the judgment of the
California Court of Appeal and remanded the case for further
proceedings, holding that "the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not require that law enforcement
agencies preserve breath samples in order to introduce the results
of breath-analysis tests at trial.",2 6  In Trombetta, the Court held
that this is true, even though the process itself is technically
feasible.2 ' The Court reasoned that the policy of non-preservation
of breath samples was not prohibited under the United States
Constitution because the test of "constitutional materiality" was
20 Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 482.
2 Id. at 483.
22 id.
23 Id.
24 Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 483-84.
25 Id. at 484.
26 Id. at 491. Justice Marshall added in a footnote, "State courts and legislatures,
of course, remain free to adopt more rigorous safeguards governing the
admissibility of. . . evidence than those imposed by the Federal Constitution."
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not met on the facts of the case. 28 "Whatever duty the constitution
imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that duty must be
limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role
in the suspect's defense."
29
The New York State courts have also recognized the
requirement of "constitutional materiality" as set forth in
Trombetta. In People v. Alvarez,30 the New York Court of Appeals
confronted virtually the same issue of whether to suppress
breathalyzer test results where a second breath sample was not
available for the defendants' use in their defense. The appellants
were arrested for drunk driving offenses after submitting to a
breathalyzer test, after the test results indicated a blood alcohol
content higher than the legal limit in New York.31 The appellants
moved to suppress the test results, arguing that because the breath
samples were destroyed by the administration of the tests, the Due
Process Clause of the State Constitution required that the police
take and preserve a second sample for later use by the appellants.
32
The Criminal Court of the City of New York held that the taking
and preservation of a second breath sample, which it found to be a
"simple and accurate" procedure, was required under the New
York State Constitution and therefore, the court suppressed the
primary breathalyzer results.33  The Appellate Term of the
Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department reversed, denying
appellants' motion to suppress.34 The appellants moved for leave
to appeal the Appellate Term's decision and the New York Court
of Appeals granted the motion, affirming the Appellate Term's
denial of appellants' suppression motions. 35 The New York Court
of Appeals adopted the reasoning of Trombetta, that "the failure of
the police to take and preserve a breath sample for later testing
does not deprive criminal defendants of a 'meaningful opportunity
28 Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488-89.
29 Id. (referring to U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109-10).
30 70 N.Y.2d 375, 515 N.E.2d 898, 521 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1987).
31 Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d at 377, 515 N.E.2d at 898, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 212
(explaining that, "[iln each case the police took a single breath sample using a
Smith & Wesson Model 900A Breathalyzer machine").
32 Id. at 377, 515 N.E.2d at 898-99, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
3 Id. at 378, 515 N.E.2d at 899, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
34 Id.
35 Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d at 378, 515 N.E.2d at 899, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
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to present a complete defense,' and thus does not violate the
Federal Constitution," as a matter of New York State
Constitutional law. 
36
The New York Court of Appeals used both an
"interpretive" and a "non-interpretive" analysis in considering
whether in a particular case such as Alvarez, the New York
Constitution provides greater protection than is afforded by the
Federal Constitution.37  The practical considerations of the need
for Federal-State uniformity was also considered by the Court of
Appeals.38 In applying these principles to the case at bar, the Court
of Appeals found no basis for departing from Trombetta as a
matter of State constitutional law:
39
The interpretive factors of textual, structural and
historical diifferences between the due process
provisions are not material for present purposes.
Under a non-interpretive analysis, there can be no
doubt in New York that the fairness of a criminal
proceeding is of particular State concern, and New
York historically has provided various protections
in this area above the Federal Constitutional
minimum .... The Supreme Court's analysis and
result in Trombetta, however, are consonant with
New York State law and ... we believe, they are
analytically correct and provide a fair and proper
rule under our State Constitution.4 °
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals found that New York
case law does not support any requirement that the police
affirmatively gather evidence for the accused, nor does it impede
36 Id.
37 Id. The Court of Appeals, looking at its recent decision in People v. PJ
Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, first identified "interpretive" factors, which focus on
differences in the text, structure or historical underpinnings between the State
and Federal Constitutions, then considered "non-interpretive" factors, including
whether the right at issue has historically been afforded greater protection in
New York than is presently required under the federal constitution, whether the
right is "of peculiar State or local concern," or whether the State citizenry has
"distinctive attitudes" toward the right. Id.
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the defendant's ability to obtain this evidence himself for defense
purposes.4' Ultimately, the Court of Appeals forcefully stated,
"[i]n sum, the analysis of the court in Trombetta, which we find
persuasive, finds full support in the decisions of the courts of this
State. ' 2
In sum, federal and New York State law treat due process
issues with respect to preservation of evidence in the same manner.
In analyzing whether a lack of recording requirement violates an
individual's constitutional right to due process of law under the
United States Constitution, federal courts apply a "constitutional
materiality" standard to determine whether that non-preservation
substantially affects an individual's constitutional rights. The New
York State courts have generally adhered to the "constitutional
materiality" standard in protecting an individual's right to a fair
trial. This standard requires a case-by-case determination of
whether the lack of recording requirement is constitutionally
significant. Although both Trombetta and Alvarez discuss the
preservation of breath samples in drunk driving cases, such cases
can be easily analogized to Owens, where the defendant also
moved to suppress evidence, although of a different kind, because
the evidence, alleged oral statements, have not been "preserved"
through electronic recording.
Wendy Holland
4 Id. at 381, 515 N.E.2d at 901, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 212. The Court of Appeals
added that "the Legislature has provided that a defendant has a statutory right to
have a personal physician administer an additional chemical test." Id.42 Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d at 380, 515 N.E.2d at 900, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
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